FARMERS & MERCHANTS BANCORP - Annual Report: 2020 (Form 10-K)

Indicate by check mark whether the registrant is a large accelerated filer, an accelerated filer, a non-accelerated filer, a smaller reporting company or an emerging growth company. See the definitions of “large accelerated filer,” “accelerated filer,” “smaller reporting company,” and “emerging growth company” in Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act.

If an emerging growth company, indicate by check mark if the registrant has elected not to use the extended transition period for complying with any new or revised financial accounting standards provided pursuant to Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act. ☐

Bank holding companies and banks are extensively regulated under both federal and state law. The regulation is intended primarily for the protection of the banking system and the deposit insurance fund and not for the benefit of stockholders of the Company. This supervisory and regulatory framework subjects banks and bank holding companies to regular examination by their respective regulatory agencies, which results in examination reports and ratings that, while not publicly available, can affect the conduct and growth of their businesses. These examinations consider not only compliance with applicable laws and regulations, but also capital levels, asset quality and risk, management ability and performance, earnings, liquidity, and various other factors. The regulatory agencies generally have broad discretion to impose restrictions and limitations on the operations of a regulated entity where the agencies determine, among other things, that such operations are unsafe or unsound, fail to comply with applicable law or are otherwise inconsistent with laws and regulations or with the supervisory policies of these agencies.

On May 24, 2018 President Trump signed the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief and Consumer Protection Act (the “Economic Growth Act”), which repeals or modifies certain provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and eases regulations on all but the largest banks. The Economic Growth Act’s highlights include improving consumer access to mortgage credit that, among other things: (i) exempt banks with less than $10 billion in assets from the ability-to-repay requirements for certain qualified residential mortgage loans; (ii) not require appraisals for certain transactions valued at less than $400,000 in rural areas; (iii) exempt banks and credit unions that originate fewer than 500 open-end and 500 closed-end mortgages from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act’s (“HMDA”) expanded data disclosures (the provision would not apply to nonbanks and would not exempt institutions from HMDA reporting altogether); (iv) amend the SAFE Mortgage Licensing Act by providing registered mortgage loan originators in good standing with 120 days of transitional authority to originate loans when moving from a federal depository institution to a non-depository institution or across state lines; (v) require the CFPB to clarify how TRID applies to mortgage assumption transactions and construction-to-permanent home loans as well as outline certain liabilities related to model disclosure use; and (vi) provide that federal banking regulators may not impose higher capital standards on High Volatility Commercial Real Estate exposures unless they are for acquisition, development or construction (“ADC”), and clarifies ADC status. In addition, the Economic Growth Act’s highlights also include regulatory relief for certain institutions, whereby among other things, it simplifies capital calculations by requiring regulators to adopt a threshold for a community bank leverage ratio of between 8% to 10%. Institutions under $10 billion in assets that meet such community bank leverage ratio will automatically be deemed to be well-capitalized, although regulators retain the flexibility to determine that a depository institution may not qualify for the community bank leverage ratio test based on the institution’s risk profile, and exempts community banks from Section 13 of the Bank Holding Company Act if they have less than $10 billion in total consolidated assets; and exempts banks with less than $10 billion in assets, and total trading assets and liabilities not exceeding more than five percent of their total assets, from the Volcker Rule restrictions on trading with their own capital. The Economic Growth Act also adds certain protections for consumers, including veterans and active duty military personnel, expanded credit freezes and creation of an identity theft protection database. The Economic Growth Act also makes changes for bank holding companies, as it raises the threshold for automatic designation as a systemically important financial institution from $50 billion to $250 billion in assets, subjects banks with $100 billion to $250 billion in total assets to periodic stress tests, exempts from stress test requirements entirely banks with under $100 billion in assets, and requires the federal banking regulators to, within 180 days of passage, raise the asset threshold under the Small Bank Holding Company Policy Statement from $1 billion to $3 billion. The Economic Growth Act also adds certain protections for student borrowers.

On June 17, 2019, the federal bank regulatory agencies jointly issued a final rule to streamline regulatory reporting requirements and committed to further review of reporting burdens for smaller institutions. The rule permits insured depository institutions with total assets of less than $5 billion that do not engage in certain complex or international activities to file the most streamlined version of the call report, the FFIEC 051 Call Report. This streamlined reporting reduces the data items required to be reported in the first and third quarters by approximately 37% and became effective July 22, 2019. The Bank elected not to adopt the new streamlined version FFIEC 051 Call Report.

Many aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act are subject to rulemaking and will take effect over several years, making it difficult to anticipate the overall financial impact on us. In addition, the Economic Growth Act modifies several provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act, but are subject to implementing regulations. Although the reforms primarily target systemically important financial service providers (which the Bank is not), the Dodd-Frank Act’s influence has and is expected to continue to filter down in varying degrees to smaller institutions over time. We will continue to evaluate the effect of the Dodd-Frank Act; however, in many respects, the ultimate impact of the Dodd-Frank Act will not be fully known for years, and no current assurance may be given that the Dodd-Frank Act, or any other new legislative changes, will not have a negative impact on the results of operations and financial condition of the Company and the Bank.

The federal banking agencies have risk-based capital adequacy guidelines intended to provide a measure of capital adequacy that reflects the degree of risk associated with a banking organization’s operations, both for transactions reported on the balance sheet as assets and for transactions, such as letters of credit and recourse arrangements, that are recorded as off-balance sheet items. In 2013, the FRB, FDIC, and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency issued final rules (the “Basel III Capital Rules”) establishing a new comprehensive capital framework for U.S. banking organizations. The rules implement the Basel Committee’s December 2010 framework, commonly referred to as Basel III, for strengthening international capital standards, as well as implementing certain provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act.

The Basel III Capital Rules became effective for the Company and the Bank on January 1, 2015 (subject to phase-in periods for some of their components). The Basel III Capital Rules: (i) introduce a new capital measure called Common Equity Tier 1 (“CET1”), and a related regulatory capital ratio of CET1 to risk-weighted assets; (ii) specify that Tier 1 capital consists of CET1 and “Additional Tier 1 capital” instruments, which are instruments treated as Tier 1 instruments under the prior capital rules that meet certain revised requirements; (iii) mandate that most deductions or adjustments to regulatory capital measures be made to CET1 and not to the other components of capital; and (iv) expand the scope of the deductions from and adjustments to capital, as compared to existing regulations. Under the Basel III Capital Rules, for most banking organizations, the most common form of additional Tier 1 capital is noncumulative perpetual preferred stock and the most common form of Tier 2 capital is subordinated notes and a portion of the allowance for loan and lease losses, in each case, subject to the Basel III Capital Rules’ specific requirements.

Under the Basel III Capital Rules, the following are the initial minimum capital ratios applicable to the Company and the Bank:

The Basel III Capital Rules also introduced a “capital conservation buffer,” composed entirely of CET1, on top of these minimum risk-weighted asset ratios. The capital conservation buffer is designed to absorb losses during periods of economic stress. Banking institutions with a ratio of CET1 to risk-weighted assets above the minimum but below the capital conservation buffer will face constraints on dividends, equity repurchases and compensation based on the amount of the shortfall. The implementation of the capital conservation buffer began on January 1, 2016 and was phased in over a three-year period (increasing by that amount on each subsequent January 1, until it reached 2.5% on January 1, 2019). The Company and the Bank must now maintain the following minimum capital ratios:

The Basel III Capital Rules prescribe a new standardized approach for risk weightings that expands the risk weighting categories from the previous four Basel I-derived categories (0%, 20%, 50% and 100%) to a larger and more risk-sensitive number of categories, generally ranging from 0% for U.S. Government and agency securities, to 600% for certain equity exposures, depending on the nature of the assets. The new capital rules generally result in higher risk weights for a variety of asset classes. Additional aspects of the Basel III Capital Rules that are relevant to the Company and the Bank include:

As of December 31, 2020, the Company’s and the Bank’s capital ratios exceeded the minimum capital adequacy guideline percentage requirements of the federal banking agencies for “well capitalized” institutions under the Basel III capital rules on a fully phased-in basis.

With respect to the Bank, the Basel III capital rules also revise the prompt corrective action regulations pursuant to Section 38 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.

In December 2017, the Basel Committee published standards that it described as the finalization of the Basel III post-crisis regulatory reforms, which standards are commonly referred to as Basel IV. Among other things, these standards revise the Basel Committee’s standardized approach for credit risk (including the recalibration of the risk weights and the introduction of new capital requirements for certain “unconditionally cancellable commitments,” such as unused credit card lines of credit) and provides a new standardized approach for operational risk capital. Under the Basel framework, these standards will generally be effective on January 1, 2022, with an aggregate output floor phasing in through January 1, 2027. Under the current U.S. capital rules, operational risk capital requirements and a capital floor apply only to advanced approaches institutions, and not to the Bank. The impact of Basel IV on us will depend on how it is implemented by the federal bank regulators.

The Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as amended (“FDIA”), requires federal banking agencies to take PCA in respect of depository institutions that do not meet minimum capital requirements. The FDIA includes the following five capital tiers: “well capitalized,” “adequately capitalized,” “undercapitalized,” “significantly undercapitalized,” and “critically undercapitalized.” A depository institution’s capital tier will depend upon how its capital levels compare with various relevant capital measures and certain other factors, as established by regulation. The Basel III Capital Rules revised the PCA requirements effective January 1, 2015. Under the revised PCA provisions of the FDIA, an insured depository institution generally will be classified in the following categories based on the capital measures indicated:

An institution may be downgraded to, or deemed to be in, a capital category that is lower than indicated by its capital ratios, if it is determined to be in an unsafe or unsound condition or if it receives an unsatisfactory examination rating with respect to certain matters. A bank’s capital category is determined solely for the purpose of applying PCA regulations and the capital category may not constitute an accurate representation of the bank’s overall financial condition or prospects for other purposes.

The FDIA generally prohibits a depository institution from making any capital distributions (including payment of a dividend) or paying any management fee to its parent holding company, if the depository institution would thereafter be “undercapitalized.” “Undercapitalized” institutions are subject to growth limitations and are required to submit capital restoration plans. If a depository institution fails to submit an acceptable plan, it is treated as if it is “significantly undercapitalized.” “Significantly undercapitalized” depository institutions may be subject to a number of requirements and restrictions, including orders to sell sufficient voting stock to become “adequately capitalized,” requirements to reduce total assets, and cessation of receipt of deposits from correspondent banks. “Critically undercapitalized” institutions are subject to the appointment of a receiver or conservator.

The capital classification of a bank holding company and a bank affects the frequency of regulatory examinations, the bank holding company’s and the bank’s ability to engage in certain activities and the deposit insurance premium paid by the bank. As of December 31, 2020, we met the requirements to be “well-capitalized” based upon the aforementioned ratios for purposes of the prompt corrective action regulations, as currently in effect.

The Community Bank Leverage Ratio

On November 4, 2019, the federal banking agencies jointly issued a final rule that provides for an optional, simplified measure of capital adequacy, the community bank leverage ratio (“CBLR”) framework, for qualifying community banking organizations consistent with Section 201 of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act. The CBLR framework is designed to reduce burden by removing the requirements for calculating and reporting risk-based capital ratios for qualifying community banking organizations that opt into the framework. The final rule was effective on January 1, 2020.

The federal banking agencies have adopted guidelines that establish operational and managerial standards to promote the safety and soundness of federally insured depository institutions. The guidelines set forth standards for internal controls, information systems, internal audit systems, loan documentation, credit underwriting, interest rate exposure, asset growth, compensation, fees and benefits, asset quality and earnings.

In general, the safety and soundness guidelines prescribe the goals to be achieved in each area, and each institution is responsible for establishing its own procedures to achieve those goals. If an institution fails to comply with any of the standards set forth in the guidelines, the financial institution’s primary federal regulator may require the institution to submit a plan for achieving and maintaining compliance. If a financial institution fails to submit an acceptable compliance plan, or fails in any material respect to implement a compliance plan that has been accepted by its primary federal regulator, the regulator is required to issue an order directing the institution to cure the deficiency. Until the deficiency cited in the regulator’s order is cured, the regulator may restrict the financial institution’s rate of growth, require the financial institution to increase its capital, restrict the rates the institution pays on deposits or require the institution to take any action the regulator deems appropriate under the circumstances. Noncompliance with the standards established by the safety and soundness guidelines may also constitute grounds for other enforcement action by the federal bank regulatory agencies, including cease and desist orders and civil money penalty assessments.

Banks and other financial institutions are subject to numerous laws and regulations intended to protect consumers in their transactions with banks. These laws include, among others, laws regarding unfair and deceptive acts and practices and usury laws, as well as the following consumer protection statutes: Truth in Lending Act, Truth in Savings Act, Electronic Fund Transfer Act, Expedited Funds Availability Act, Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, Fair Housing Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, Right to Financial Privacy Act, Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, Military Lending Act and Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act.

Many states and local jurisdictions have consumer protection laws analogous, and in addition, to those listed above. These federal, state and local laws regulate the manner in which financial institutions deal with customers when taking deposits, making loans or conducting other types of transactions. Failure to comply with these laws and regulations could give rise to regulatory sanctions, customer rescission rights, action by state and local attorneys general and civil or criminal liability. Failure to comply with consumer protection requirements may also result in our failure to obtain any required bank regulatory approval for merger or acquisition transactions we may wish to pursue or our prohibition from engaging in such transactions even if approval is not required.

The structure of federal consumer protection regulation applicable to all providers of consumer financial products and services changed significantly on July 21, 2011, when the CFPB commenced operations to supervise and enforce consumer protection laws. The consumer protection provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and the examination, supervision and enforcement of those laws and implementing regulations by the CFPB have created a more intense and complex environment for consumer finance regulation. The CFPB has significant authority to implement and enforce federal consumer protection laws and new requirements for financial services products provided for in the Dodd-Frank Act, as well as the authority to identify and prohibit unfair, deceptive or abusive acts and practices. The review of products and practices to prevent such acts and practices is a continuing focus of the CFPB, and of banking regulators more broadly. The ultimate impact of this heightened scrutiny is uncertain but could result in changes to pricing, practices, products and procedures. It could also result in increased costs related to regulatory oversight, supervision and examination, additional remediation efforts and possible penalties. In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act provides the CFPB with broad supervisory, examination and enforcement authority over various consumer financial products and services, including the ability to require reimbursements and other payments to customers for alleged legal violations and to impose significant penalties, as well as injunctive relief that prohibits lenders from engaging in allegedly unlawful practices. The CFPB also has the authority to obtain cease and desist orders providing for affirmative relief or monetary penalties. The Dodd-Frank Act does not prevent states from adopting stricter consumer protection standards. State regulation of financial products and potential enforcement actions could also adversely affect our business, financial condition or results of operations.

The CFPB is authorized to issue rules for both bank and nonbank companies that offer consumer financial products and services, subject to consultation with the prudential banking regulators. In general, however, banks with assets of $10 billion or less, such as the Bank, will continue to be examined for consumer compliance by their primary bank regulator.

In 2010, the federal bank regulatory agencies issued comprehensive guidance intended to ensure that the incentive compensation policies of banking organizations do not undermine the safety and soundness of those organizations by encouraging excessive risk-taking. The incentive compensation guidance sets expectations for banking organizations concerning their incentive compensation arrangements and related risk-management, control and governance processes. The incentive compensation guidance, which covers all employees that have the ability to materially affect the risk profile of an organization, either individually or as part of a group, is based upon three primary principles: (1) balanced risk-taking incentives; (2) compatibility with effective controls and risk management; and (3) strong corporate governance. Any deficiencies in compensation practices that are identified may be incorporated into the organization’s supervisory ratings, which can affect its ability to make acquisitions or take other actions. In addition, under the incentive compensation guidance, a banking organization’s federal supervisor may initiate enforcement action if the organization’s incentive compensation arrangements pose a risk to the safety and soundness of the organization.

In 2016, several federal financial agencies (including the FRB and FDIC) re-proposed restrictions on incentive-based compensation pursuant to Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Act for financial institutions with $1 billion or more in total consolidated assets. For institutions with at least $1 billion but less than $50 billion in total consolidated assets, the proposal would impose principles-based restrictions that are broadly consistent with existing interagency guidance on incentive-based compensation. Such institutions would be prohibited from entering into incentive compensation arrangements that encourage inappropriate risks by the institution: (i) by providing an executive officer, employee, director, or principal shareholder with excessive compensation, fees, or benefits; or (ii) that could lead to material financial loss to the institution. The comment period for these proposed regulations has closed, but a final rule has not been published. Depending upon the outcome of the rule making process, the application of this rule to us could require us to revise our compensation strategy, increase our administrative costs and adversely affect our ability to recruit and retain qualified employees. Further, as discussed above, the Basel III Capital Rules limit discretionary bonus payments to bank executives if the institution’s regulatory capital ratios fail to exceed certain thresholds that started being phased in on January 1, 2016.

If any of the following risks actually occur, our financial condition and results of operations could be materially and adversely affected. If this were to happen, the value of our common stock could decline significantly, and you could lose all or part of your investment.